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1. Introduction 
Current levels of subsidization in public transport make it difficult to accept that no generally 
valid economic justification exists for these subsidies.  Traditional economic arguments for 
subsidizing public transport, such as economies in production, second-best, and distributional 
equity, have proven to be weak (see, e.g., De Borger et al., 2002, Hencher, 1998, Paulley et 
al., 2006, Small, 1992).  The final remaining argument is due to Mohring (1972), who argues 
that public transport exhibits user economies that result in underproduction.  However, van 
Reeven (2008) shows that the modeling assumptions in Mohring (1972) do not result in 
underproduction and, therefore, subsidization of public transport is not an imperative. 
In this journal, Savage and Small (2009) and Basso and Jara-Díaz (2009) argue that the 
consumer homogeneity assumption is critical in van Reeven (2008), and that a monopolist 
will undersupply frequency when consumers are heterogeneous and have downward-sloping 
demand.  Basso and Jara-Díaz (2009) demonstrate this for the uniform distribution of 
consumers’ reservation prices, which results in a linearly decreasing demand function.  
Savage and Small (2009) show that the shape of the distribution is irrelevant in this respect.  
As long as consumers do not know the timetable, any distribution that leads to a downward-
sloping demand schedule results in the under-provision of frequency.  Savage and Small 
argue that this result becomes ambiguous if consumers know the timetable, as both 
undersupply and oversupply can occur. 
Van Reeven (2008) shows that consumers have an incentive to get to know the timetable.  
Learning the times of departure reduces their waiting costs.  This unambiguously increases 
the demand for transportation so that operators have an incentive to publish the timetable.  
Hence, in a general equilibrium framework, consumers must be informed.  In this paper, we 
generalize van Reeven (2008) to heterogeneous consumers who know the timetable.  The 
results of this generalization are as follows. 
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Whether monopoly oversupplies or undersupplies frequency depends on a trade-off 
between two effects.  The first effect is the traditional result that a monopolist prices above 
marginal cost, which results in the production of a lower quantity than is socially desirable.  
In an equilibrium context, this creates an incentive to undersupply frequency relative to the 
social optimum. 
The second effect is pointed out by Spence (1975).  A social planner looks at the effect of 
an increase in quality (read: frequency) on all consumers in average, whereas the monopolist 
considers this effect on the marginal consumer.  In public transport, for optimally chosen 
departure times (see van Reeven, 2008, for the uniform distribution, and Janssen et al., 2005, 
for non-uniform distributions), the marginal consumer, i.e., the consumer who is indifferent 
between two consecutive departures times, has a waiting time that is twice as large as the 
waiting time of an average consumer.  This creates an incentive to oversupply frequency 
relative to the social optimum. 
The balance of these two forces is determined by the distribution of consumers’ 
reservation prices.  In van Reeven (2008), consumers are homogeneous, and the distribution is 
degenerate and concentrated at the utility level of an outside option, e.g., private car, in the 
spirit of Salop (1979).  This eliminates the incentive to undersupply frequency, and the 
monopolist oversupplies with informed consumers, and is socially optimal with uninformed 
consumers.  In Basso and Jara-Díaz (2009), to the contrary, consumers’ reservation prices are 
distributed evenly, which is the opposite case.  This eliminates the incentive to oversupply 
frequency, so that the monopolist strictly undersupplies. 
Using the family of the power distribution functions, which has the homogeneous 
consumer case of van Reeven (2008) on one hand, and the uniform distribution of Basso and 
Jara-Díaz (2009) on the other, as two opposite limiting cases, we show that there is a critical 
degree of heterogeneity with the following property.  If the heterogeneity in consumer 
reservation price is stronger than the critical level, the undersupply result occurs.  If, to the 
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contrary the heterogeneity is weaker, the monopolist oversupplies.  This illustrates the 
argument of Savage and Small (2009) that undersupply and, therefore, subsidization of public 
transport is not an imperative. 
Without an empirical investigation of the shape of the distribution function of 
consumers’ reservation prices, theoretical modeling will hardly shed a new light on the 
likelihood of undersupply/oversupply outcomes.  Considering private car as the main 
alternative to public transport, it is reasonable to assume that consumers’ reservation prices 
are concentrated around the entry costs of the car.  This concentration makes oversupply just 
as likely as undersupply. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 sets up the model which is then 
analyzed in Section 3.  Section 4 concludes. 
2. The model 
We build the model of a monopolist that provides a public transport service on van Reeven 
(2008).  The monopolist schedules f equidistant departures in a unit time circle [ )1,01 ≡∈ Sy  
so that the time gap between two consecutive departures is f/1 .  A unit measure of 
consumers decides whether to use a public transport service on a fixed route.  Each consumer 
i  is characterized by his most preferred departure time 1Syi ∈ , and by his reservation price 
[ ]vvi ,0∈ , where 0>v .  When this consumer uses the public transport service and departs at 
time y , he gets the following utility (surplus): 
iii pvu τ−−= , 
where p is the price charged by the monopolist, ii tw=τ  is the disutility of waiting, 
ii yyw −=  is the consumer’s waiting time, and 0>t  is the consumers’ waiting cost per unit 
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of time.1  When consumers decide not to use the service, their surplus is zero.  Thus, we 
interpret the reservation price iv  as a gross utility level from using the monopoly public 
transport service net of the opportunity cost. 
Consumers’ most preferred departure time iy  is evenly distributed in time, so that the 
waiting disutility iτ  is uniformly distributed over the interval [ x,0 ], where ( )ftx 2/=  is the 
maximum waiting disutility that consumers can experience.  Consumers’ reservation price iv  
follows a distribution ( ) ( )kvvvF /= , where [ )∞∈ ,1k .  This family of the power distribution 
functions has the following property.  For 1=k , iv  is uniformly distributed over the interval 
[ ]v,0 , as in Basso and Jara-Díaz (2009).  In the limit when k unboundedly increases, all iv  
become equal to the highest level v  with probability one.  This is the uniform reservation 
price as in van Reeven (2008).  Without loss of generality we assume 1=v .2 
In order to abstract from the effect of returns to scale in the transportation industry, we 
assume that monopoly operates at zero marginal cost and pays constant fixed cost 0>c  per 
unit of frequency.  For the sake of convenience, we assume that the choice variable is not the 
frequency but the maximum waiting disutility x , from which the frequency can be obtained 
by ( )xtf 2/= .  When 1=> vx , no consumers travel, so that the feasible range of x is 
[ ]1,0∈x .  Thus, the monopoly profit is given by 
( ) ( ) ( )
x
ctxppDcfxppDxp
2
,,, −=−=π , 
where ( ) ( )0Pr, ≥−−= ptwvxpD ii  is the demand for public transport, i.e., the measure of 
consumers who get non-negative surplus from using the service at price p.  When 1>p , no 
                                                                          
1  When iyy < , iτ  can be interpreted as a schedule delay cost. 
2 This only has the effect on measurement units of all the costs, prices, and utility levels. 
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consumer uses the service from the monopolist, so that the feasible range of p is [ ]1,0∈p .  
Profit maximizing values of x, p, and f are denoted by πx , πp , and πf . 
In order to compare πf  with the first best frequency, we compute the social welfare 
function, which is: 
( ) ( ) ( )xpxpSxpSW ,,, π+= , 
where ( ) ( ) ( )0,, ≥−−−−⋅= ptwvptwvExpDxpS iiii  is the aggregate consumer surplus.  
Social welfare maximizing, i.e., the first best, values of x, p, and f are denoted by FBx , FBp , 
and FBf .  The purpose of the analysis is to compare FBf  and πf  for different values of the 
parameter k. 
3. The analysis 
We begin with computing aggregate demand and consumer surplus.  Let us fix values of 
[ ]1,0∈x , price [ ]1,0∈p , and a single departure time y, and only consider consumers with 
most preferred departure times from the interval [ ]txytxyyi /,/ +−∈ .  All such consumers, 
if they opt for using the service, will depart at time y  because it is their closest departure 
time. 
Suppose that x  is chosen optimally so that monopoly profit or social welfare is strictly 
positive.3  Then, when ( ]1,1 xp −∈  all consumers with 



+
−
+∪

 −
−−∈
t
xy
t
py
t
py
t
xyyi ,
11,  
                                                                          
3  The case when exogenous parameter c, t, and k lead to zero maximum values of the profit function 
and social welfare function is non-generic. 
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do not travel irrespective of iv  as ( ) 01 ≤−−−<−−= ppvpvu iiii τ .  In this case, there are 
gaps in demand in the time space, and profit or social welfare values can be increased by 
decreasing x , i.e., by having more departures at smaller intervals from each other.  Thus, the 
case when ( ]1,1 xp −∈  cannot happen with optimal value of x , and we restrict the domains 
of the profit function ( )xp,π  and social welfare function ( )xpSW ,  so that they still contain 
the corresponding optimal values ( )ππ xp ,  and ( )FBFB xp ,  by [ ]1,0∈x  and [ ]xp −∈ 1,0 . 
For fixed values of [ ]1,0∈x  and [ ]xp −∈ 1,0 , we divide all consumers with 
[ ]txytxyyi /,/ +−∈  into the following three categories. 
a) Consumers with reservation price [ )pvi ,0∈  get negative surplus from the service: 
0<−−= iii twpvu . 
These consumers do not use the public transport service and get zero consumer surplus: 
( ) 0=ivs . 
b) Consumers with reservation price ( ]1,xpvi +∈  get positive surplus from the service 
irrespective of their most preferred departure time iy : 
0>−−≥−−= xpvtwpvu iiii . 
These consumers use the public transport service and get consumer surplus: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )xpv
t
xdytypvdyuvs i
tx
iii
txy
txy
iii −−=−−== 
+
−
22
/
0
/
/
. 
c) Consumers with reservation price [ ]xppvi +∈ ,  get positive surplus from the service 
only when 0≥−−= iii twpvu , that is, when their most preferred departure time iy  
belongs to the following interval: 


 −
+
−
−∈
t
pvy
t
pvyy iii , . 
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Such consumers use the public transport service and get consumer surplus: 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
t
pvdytypvdyuvs i
tpv
iii
tpvy
tpvy
iii
ii
i
2/
0
/
/
2 −=−−== 
−−+
−−
. 
Aggregate consumer surplus ( )xpS ,  can be found by integrating ( )vs  over [ ]1,0∈v  with 
respect to the distribution function ( )vF , and then by multiplying by the number of 
departures ( )xtf 2/= : 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 



−−+
−
== 
+
−
+
−
1
11
21
0
2
2
,
xp
k
xp
p
k dvkvxpv
t
xdvkv
t
pv
x
tvdFvsfxpS  
In order to find aggregate consumer demand, we differentiate (the negative of) the aggregate 
consumer surplus with respect to price: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )11
1,
111
11
+
−+
−=+−=
∂
∂
−≡
++
+
−
+
−  kx pxpdvkvdvkvpvxpSxpD
kk
xp
k
xp
p
k  
It is worth to note at this stage that when consumers are uninformed, they all experience 
waiting disutility 2/x , and the aggregate consumer surplus ( )xpSUN ,  will be written as 
( ) ( )( ) 



−−= 
+
−
1
2/
12
2
,
xp
kUN dvkvxpv
t
x
x
txpS , 
which will lead to the following aggregate demand from uninformed consumers 
( )
k
UN xp
p
SxpD 


+−=
∂
∂
−≡
2
1,  
For 1=k , ( )xpDUN ,  coincides with ( )xpD ,  as argued by Basso and Jara-Díaz (2009).  
However, this is just a coincidence and demands ( )xpDUN ,  and ( )xpD ,  are different for 
1≠k . 
The monopoly profit function ( )xp,π  is: 
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( ) ( ) ( )( ) x
ct
kx
pxpp
x
ctxppDxp
kk
21
1
2
,,
11
−



+
−+
−=−=
++
π  
First, we look at the social welfare function ( )xpSW , .  Using pSD ∂−∂= / , it is easy to 
check that ( )xpSW ,  strictly decreases in p for all 0>p : 
( ) ( ) 0, <−+−=
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
++
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
x
pxpp
p
Dp
p
DpxpD
p
S
pp
S
p
SW kkπ . 
Hence, the first-best price is zero, 0=FBp , so that the social planner chooses [ ]1,0∈x  in 
order to maximize the following (reduced-form) social welfare function: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) x
ct
k
kxx
kk
x
ctdvkvxv
t
xdvkv
t
v
x
txxSxpSWxSW
k
x
k
x
kFB
212
1
12
1
2
2
2
,0,0,
1
1
1
0
1
2
*
−
+
+−
++
=
−



−+=+=≡
+
−− π
 
The resulting socially optimal values of the maximum waiting cost FBx  and the corresponding 
frequency FBf  are: 
[ ]
( )xSWx
x
FB *
1,0
maxarg
∈
≡  and FB
FB
x
tf
2
≡ .4 
The monopolist chooses [ ]1,0∈x  and [ ]xp −∈ 1,0  in order to maximize ( )xp,π .  Profit 
maximizing values of price πp , the maximum waiting cost πx , and the corresponding 
frequency πf  are: 
( )
[ ][ ]
( )xpxp
xp
x
,maxarg,
1,0
1,0
πππ
−∈
∈
≡  and π
π
x
tf
2
≡ . 
As the first best and profit maximizing values depend on the distribution of reservation prices 
through the parameter k, we often write them as functions of k explicitly. 
                                                                          
4  Generically, for the chosen class of distribution functions, the problems of maximization of social 
welfare and monopoly profit always have a unique solution, which explains the chosen definitions. 
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Whether monopoly profit and social welfare are positive or negative depends on the 
exogenous value of ct .  Apart from k, this product of fixed cost c  and unit waiting cost t  is 
the only exogenous entry in the objective functions ( )xp,π  and ( )xSW * .5  When the 
monopolist gets non-negative profits, social welfare is non-negative as well.  In what follows, 
we assume that the value of the product ct  is sufficiently low so that a monopoly is 
operational for any 1≥k .  In particular, we assume that 27/4=< Cct .  Next, we will relax 
this assumption and discuss the case Cct > , for which the monopoly profit might become 
negative for some values of k. 
In the following proposition, we generalize the result of van Reeven (2008), which is 
obtained for the limiting case when k unboundedly increases, and which we formally (with 
slight abuse of the notation) denote by ∞=k .  We show that the monopolist always 
oversupplies frequency when the distribution density function of consumers’ reservation 
prices sufficiently increases, which is measured by parameter k. 
Proposition 1.  For all large values of k, the monopolist over-produces frequency, i.e., there 
exists 1* ≥k  such that for all *kk > : ( ) ( ) ( )kxxkx FBFB <∞<π  and ( ) ( ) ( )kffkf FBFB >∞>π . 
Proof.  Van Reeven (2008) shows that in the limit when ∞→k : 
( ) ( ) ctxctx FB =∞<=∞
2
π , so that ( ) ( )
c
tf
c
tf FB
42
=∞>=∞π . 
We first show that there exists a 0>δ  such that ( ) δπ >kx  for all 1≥k , and we can restrict 
the domains of the functions ( )xp,π  and ( )xSW *  by [ ]1,δ∈x .  Next, we show that there 
exists 1* >k  such that ( ) ( )∞< FBxkxπ  for all *kk > .  Finally, we show that ( ) ( )∞> FBFB xkx  
for all 1≥k , and the statement of the proposition follows. 
                                                                          
5  For a fixed level of ct , the value of t  has its own and independent of ct  effect on the frequency 
choice through ( )xtf 2/= . 
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Both functions ( )xp,π  and ( )xSW *  have the following property: 
+∞==
∂
∂
→→ 200 2
limlim
x
ct
x xx
π  and +∞=


−=
→→ 2
1
2
limlim 20
*
0 x
ct
dx
dSW
xx
, 
where the convergence is uniform with respect to k.  Thus, there exists a 0>δ  such that for 
any k, p, and ( )δ,0∈x : 
0>
∂
∂
x
π  and 0
*
>
dx
dSW . 
Consequently, δ>FBx  and δπ >x , and we restrict domains of the functions ( )xp,π  and 
( )xSW *  by [ ]1,δ∈x . 
Maximizing ( )xp,π  w.r.t. ( )xp,  yields the following first-order conditions: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )




+
−+
+
+
−=
∂
∂
=
+
+
−+
−
+
−=
∂
∂
=
++
+++
12
,0
1
1,0
2
11
2
111
kx
pxpp
x
xpp
x
ctxp
x
x
p
kx
pxp
x
xppxp
p
kkk
kkkk
π
πππ
π
π
πππ
π
ππ
π
π
π
πππ
π
πππ
ππ
π
π
 
By subtracting the first equation from the second one and rearranging, we get: 
( ) ( )kG
ctkx
12 −
=
π , 
where 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) 



−
+
−++
=
+++
π
π
π
πππππ
x
p
kx
pxpxpkG
kkk 1
2
11
1
1
2 . 
It is easy to see that ( ) 0lim 1 =
∞→
kG
k
 uniformly for [ ]1,δπ ∈x  and ππ xp −≤1 .  Hence, there 
exists 1* >k  such that ( ) 11 <kG  for all *kk > .  Therefore, for all such *kk > : 
( ) ( ) ( )∞==−<−=
FBxctct
kG
ctkx
122 1
π . 
Maximizing ( )xSW *  w.r.t. [ ]1,δ∈x  yields the following first-order condition: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
kFB
FB
FB x
kx
ctx
dx
dSW
2
1
2
1
2
0 2
*
+
+−== , 
which leads to the following expression: 
( ) ( ) ( )∞=>−=
FBFB xct
kG
ctkx
21
, 
where 
( ) ( ) ( ) 02
2
2 >+
=
kx
k
kG π . 
Thus, ( ) ( ) ( )kxxkx FBFB <∞<π  for all *kk > .  This ends the proof. ■ 
Proposition 1 demonstrates that the monopolist oversupplies frequency not only when 
consumers are homogeneous and have unit demand but also when consumers are 
heterogeneous and demand is downward-sloping.  Two effects determine whether monopoly 
oversupplies or undersupplies frequency.  The first effect follows from the traditional result 
that a monopoly under-produces due to pricing above marginal cost.  This creates a strict 
incentive to decrease the frequency.  The second effect is that the monopolist has a strict 
incentive to oversupply frequency relative to the social optimum because the waiting time of a 
marginal consumer is twice as large as the waiting time of an average consumer. 
When the reservation price distribution density function sufficiently increases so that its 
variance 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )21var 222 ++=−= kk kvEvEv iii , 
which reflects consumer heterogeneity, is relatively small, the first effect is weak and the 
desire of the monopolist to increase consumer demand by choosing higher level of frequency 
drives the oversupply result.  When, to the contrary, the reservation price distribution is more 
even, the first effect is strong, monopoly output is low, and, consequently, frequency will be 
undersupplied. 
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The latter is the case for the uniform distribution, when 1=k , as Basso and Jara-Díaz 
(2009) show.  Also for 2=k  the monopolist undersupplies frequency, as the following 
proposition demonstrates. 
Proposition 2.  For { }2,1∈k , the monopolist undersupplies frequency, i.e., FBxx >π  and 
FBff <π . 
Proof.  For 1=k , the proof is given in Basso and Jara-Díaz (2009).  When Cct < , the 
monopoly is profitable.  Indeed, by choosing, e.g., 3/1=p  and 3/2=x , monopoly gets: 
0
27
4
4
3
3
2,
3
1
>


−=

 ctπ . 
Thus, monopoly is operational for Cct < . 
For 2=k , functions ( )xSW *  and ( )xp,π  are given by: 
( )
x
ctxxxSW
23
2
2
1
12
1 3*
−+−= , and ( )
x
ctxpxppxp
23
11, 22 −


−−−=π . 
Maximizing ( )xSW *  yields the bi-quadratic equation 022 24 =+− ctxx .  A unique suitable 
solution is ctxFB 211 −−= .  Maximizing ( )xp,π  w.r.t. p yields ( ) 3/3 ππ xp −= , and 
the bi-quadratic equation 0962 24 =+− ctxx  (this equation is only valid for 
( ) 63.02/33 ≈−≤πx  so that 1≤+ ππ xp ; if this is not the case, then the corner solution 
ππ xp −= 1  must be taken). 
The unique suitable solution is ( ) FBxctx 2/32/2113 =−−=π , so that 
FBFB fff <= 3/2π .  This ends the proof. ■ 
Propositions 1 and 2 provide a partial characterization of the frequency chosen by the 
monopolist relative to the first best.  In accordance with Proposition 2, at least 2* >k .  In 
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order to find out the lowest value of *k , which ensures oversupply ( ) ( )kfkf FB>π  for all 
*kk > , we have performed numerical simulations.6  It turns out that the maximization (of the 
profit and social welfare functions) problems have nice analytical properties (monotonicity 
and quasi-concavity), so that ( )kxπ  and ( )kxFB  are monotone and the numerical algorithms 
used in the simulations rapidly converge. 
Figure 1 shows functions ( )kf π  and ( )kf FB  for Cct <= 1.0  and 1=t .  The value of *k  
is defined by ( ) ( )** kfkf FB=π .  It turns out that ( ) ( )** kfkf FB>π  for all *kk <  and 
( ) ( )** kxkx FB<π  for all *kk > . 
 
Figure 2 shows how the critical value *k  continuously and monotonically depends on ct  for 
Cct < .  When ct  converges to zero, the value of *k  unboundedly increases.  It can be seen 
that the frequency oversupply result holds only for 7.4≈> kk . 
                                                                          
6 The simulations are performed within MS Excel on VBA, and this tool is available from the 
corresponding author upon request. 
0
1
2
3
0 10 20 30 40 50
 
 
 
 
f
k
( )kf π
( )kf FB
( )ctk*
 
Figure 1. Profit maximizing frequency ( )kf π  and socially optimal frequency ( )kf FB  as 
functions of k  for 1.0=ct  and 1=t . 
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It is important to note that ( )ctk *  decreases with cost parameter ct , so that an increase in ct  
makes oversupply more likely.  The intuition is that for larger cost values, the monopoly 
frequency πf  decreases at a much lower pace than socially optimal frequency FBf .  This is so 
because the condition 1≤+ ππ px  becomes binding, and the monopoly price is a corner 
solution ππ xp −= 1 .  As a result, the monopolist has a much lower incentive to reduce 
frequency as the required decrease in price has a strong adverse effect on monopoly profit. 
In the analysis, we have assumed Cct <  so that monopoly is operational for any k.  For a 
given value of k, there is a range of ct  values where monopoly does not produce even though 
it would have been socially optimal.  Savage and Small (2009) point out that subsidizing the 
monopolist in this case is a solution to this market failure.  We now turn to this market failure 
and have a closer look at the impact of subsidization. 
Figure 3 presents an example of the reduced-form social welfare function ( )xSW *  and 
the reduced-form profit function ( ) ( )xpx
p
,max* ππ ≡  for 4=k  and Cct >= 5.0 .  The 
maximizing values of x for ( )xSW *  and ( )x*π  are 75.0≈FBx  and 67.0≈πx  respectively.  
For the chosen parameter values, the monopoly is inactive because its maximum profit level is 
negative: ( ) 0141.0* <−≈ππ x . 
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Figure 2. Critical value function ( )ctk * . 
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Subsidizing the monopolist with the amount of 141.0=Δ  guarantees him just a non-negative 
profit, and the production starts (we assume the moral hazard problem away).  The main point 
of this example is that such subsidy results in oversupply as FBxx <π .  In order to sustain the 
socially optimal frequency ( )FBFB xtf 2/= , the subsidy has to be at least 
( ) 149.0* ≈−=Δ FBxπ , i.e., the monopoly must receive additional subsidy in order to able to 
produce this lower frequency profitably.  However, such additional subsidy does not give any 
incentive to do so unless the first best level of frequency is explicitly imposed on the 
monopolist. 
We are now able to relax our assumption Cct <  and extend our computations by 
assuming that the monopolist gets a lump-sum subsidy if its profit is negative.  Figure 4 
represents the parameter space with [ ]1,0∈ct  on the horizontal axis and 1≥k  in the log scale 
on the vertical axis.  We have also drawn a line that represents ∞=k .  The bold line 
represents the generalization of the critical value function ( )ctk *  for [ ]1,0∈ct .  The shaded 
area to the left of ( )ctk *  reflects those parameter values for which the monopolist 
undersupplies.  For all other parameter constellations, the monopolist oversupplies.  In case 
381.0≈> Cct , monopoly operation always yields oversupply regardless the value of k.  In 
order to see whether this oversupply is generated under profitable conditions or under 
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Figure 3. Functions ( )xSW *  and ( )x*π  for 1=k  and 3.0=ct . 
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subsidization, the other two curves ( )ctkπ  (we do not have a closed form expression for it) 
and ( ) ( )ctctctk FB −= 1/2  represent those parameter values for which the maximum values of 
monopoly profit ( )ππ x*  and social welfare ( )FBxSW *  equal zero. 
 
In the region below ( )ctk FB , it is not socially optimal to produce a transportation service.  In 
the region between ( )ctk FB  and ( )ctkπ , production is socially optimal but requires a subsidy.  
Finally, in the region above ( )ctkπ , service provision is optimal and the monopoly gets 
positive profit.  Hence, figure 4 shows that under subsidization oversupply may occur for all 
1≥k , and therefore is even more likely to happen. 
Finally, we admit that the original model of van Reeven (2008), as well as this 
generalization, is very stylized.  Savage and Small (2009) argue that a richer model is required 
for the proper analysis of the monopoly frequency choice.  Nevertheless, even these simple 
models make it clear that theoretically oversupply is equally likely to happen as undersupply.  
Extending the model will certainly change the balance of the effects presented here.  
However, it is not obvious that such extensions will favor undersupply.  For example, 
increasing marginal production cost (e.g., due to increasing boarding and alighting costs when 
vehicles become fuller) strengthens the incentive to increase frequency.  Similarly, increasing 
1
10
100
0 0.5 1
ct
k
( )ctk*
∞
( )ctk FB( )ctkπ
C C
 
Figure 4. Parameter’s space ( )kct, , regions of undersupply (shaded) and oversupply. 
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marginal waiting cost increases the difference in utility between the average and the marginal 
consumers and, therefore, further increases the incentive to oversupply.  Hence, oversupply is 
even more likely to happen under these assumptions. 
4. Conclusion 
Van Reeven (2008) shows that monopoly does not undersupply frequency if consumers are 
homogeneous with respect to their reservation price.  This result generalizes to the case of 
heterogeneous consumers when the distribution density function of consumers’ reservation 
price peaks.  In contrast, when consumers are very heterogeneous, so that reservation prices 
are distributed evenly and the distribution function rather flat, the monopolist undersupplies 
frequency.  Hence, the question whether a monopolist oversupplies or undersupplies 
frequency critically depends on how heterogeneous the costs of alternative means of travel 
are. 
Since the private car is the main alternative to public transport, consumers’ reservation 
prices are likely to be concentrated around the entry costs of the private car.  The distribution 
density function may include some other peaks for other alternatives to public transport as 
well.  These concentrations in the distribution function make oversupply just as likely as 
undersupply.  It very much depends on the particular case at hand and requires empirical 
research on the exact shape of the distribution of consumers’ reservation prices, as well as 
other effects that are omitted in our analysis for simplicity. 
The main implication from the analysis is that the oversupply of frequency by a 
monopolist in public transport cannot be excluded, so that subsidization in public transport is 
not an imperative.  For many years, the transport economic literature has been preoccupied 
with aligning economic theory with increasing subsidization of public transport in practice.  It 
generalizes and improves Mohring’s original model with a better representation of user costs.  
 19
Every improvement has come with even higher levels of optimal production, as shown, e.g., 
by Jara-Díaz and Gschwender (2003), justifying ever-increasing subsidies to public transport 
operations.  In this respect, van Reeven (2008) may have put the cat among the pigeons, 
whereas this paper provides a more balanced view on the topic.  However, the main 
conclusion remains the same: just the fact that consumers’ waiting costs are external to the 
public transport monopolist does not constitute a generally valid economic justification for 
subsidization of public transport. 
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